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N
ew energy policies and incentives are crucial for boosting innova-
tion and scaling up the production of sustainable energy. In 
addition to environmental objectives such as mitigating climate 
change and reducing air pollution, governments also promote 
sustainable energy for economic and social reasons such as 
creating a manufacturing base for sustainable energy equip-
ment and generating local jobs. Strikingly, sustainable energy 
policies encompass supply and demand-oriented measures 
which, for the most part, have trade effects that are likely to 
cause dispute due to their impairment or nullification of the 
expected gains from trade agreements of other countries. In the sustainable energy 
trade, what is at stake is the need for countries to agree on the appropriate balance 
of rights and obligations, allowing them to secure their policy space for sustainable 
energy innovation and deployment, while avoiding unfair trade competition.
The main issue addressed in this chapter is to what extent ongoing globalization 
patterns and trade rules allow for the kick-starting of a transformation towards 
sustainability. We focus on photovoltaic (PV) technologies and highlight the lessons 
that can be drawn from the so-called ‘solar trade war’ which has been unfolding 
between OECD countries and particularly between EU countries and China during 
the last five years. 
The paper is organized in three parts. Part one briefly recounts the background to 
the competitive rush towards green technologies – also dubbed the ‘green race’ - and 
the rise of trade disputes over renewables that have occurred between the EU, US 
and China during the last five years. Part three reviews in greater detail the reasons 
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underlying the PV price collapses of 2009 and 2010 which triggered the solar trade 
war between the EU and China. Through the adoption of a European perspective, 
we delineate the problems with China’s exports of PV panels and equipment to 
Europe. In part three, some weaknesses in the EU’s arguments are highlighted and 
addressed. Part four focuses on what is really at stake for the EU in the solar war, 
which is followed by a conclusion that summarizes our main findings. 
The green race between the EU, US and China
Among existing renewable energy technologies, the PV sector has achieved a spectac-
ular development over the last decade, driven by a mixture of push and pull policies 
(pull in the EU and push in China) (Wang, 2013). Solar electricity generation has 
grown by a factor of more than nine between 2000 and 2011 (US Department of 
Energy, 2012) and is expected to continue to experience higher deployment rates 
than other renewable energies in the near future (IEA, 2012). China and the EU 
are the two leaders in PV production and deployment (Figures 1). The EU, and 
Germany in particular, leads in PV deployment while China and other Asian countries 
dominate the PV cell manufacturing market with nearly 77% of the global PV cell 
production in 2011. Interestingly, China’s PV cell manufacturing was almost zero 
ten years ago.
A FRENCH PERSPECTIVE
In Autumn 2008, PV panel prices plummeted in the wake of the financial and 
economic crisis in the US. Dropping by a factor of four within a quarter, prices 
then fluctuated with erratic up-and-down swings around a general downward 
trend (Figure 2). EU and US political leaders have been vocal in their efforts to 
stop the profit drain associated with falling prices from damaging their domestic PV 
firms. In 2009, the US and EU kicked off investigations and consultation requests 
at the WTO against alleged dumping by China, while adjusting their Feed-in Tariffs 
(FIT) downwards. Booming imports of PV panels from China were also behind the 
revision of FIT policies and, in the case of France, the December 2010 moratorium 
FIGURE 1 Asian breakthrough in solar power
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on public subsidies to solar energy. As acknowledged by the then French Environ-
ment Minister Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet during the inauguration of the Saint-
Charles Solaire solar central utility in the South of France in October 2011: ‘I agreed 
to come because this is French technology, together with cells from Germany, which 
are assembled in Luxembourg. There was an occasion where I refused to inaugu-
rate a centre where they make  Chinese panels’.1 Attacking China for flooding the 
EU market and prompting the bankruptcy of EU crystalline PV module producers 
has been a constant theme of the French government ever since. ‘We need financial 
support towards the creation of jobs in France and not in China,’ were the words 
of Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, which are echoed by those of France’s Minister of 
Industrial Renewal Arnaud Montebourg today.
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
Similar sentiments have also been expressed in other leading PV module producing 
EU countries, although with less consistency and unanimity. In response to a 
complaint by the European ProSun coalition headed by the German-based Solar-
World, which represents more than 25% of the EU’s total production of crystalline 
silicon PV modules and key components, in September 2012 the EU launched an 
investigation on the possible dumping of Chinese PV panels. The same coalition 
of companies also filed a separate complaint alleging that China’s producers had 
received unfair subsidies.2 Other players in the sector such as the Alliance for Afford-
able Solar Energy (AFASE) – a coalition of 450 European companies – opposed the 
envisaged duties (47% at that time) on the grounds that these could have adverse 
consequences for downstream solar energy installers or importers.3 
Along with intensive talks with China, on 6 June 2013 the European Commission 
(EC) imposed provisional anti-dumping duties on EU imports of solar panels from 
China. The duties were to be imposed in two steps, starting with 11.8% on 6 June 
and increasing to 47.6% on average on 6 August. On 27 July 2013, the EC announced 
its acceptance of an undertaking by Chinese manufacturers of solar wafers, cells and 
modules to fix minimum import prices for their products, with a volume cap to be 
imposed on Chinese solar exporters to the EU. The list of Chinese manufacturers 
signing up to the deal negotiated by the EC trade commissioner Karel de Gucht 
and his counterpart in the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (Mofcom) Gao Hucheng, 
included all the big names such as Yingli, Suntech, GCL Poly, JA Solar, Canadian 
Solar, China Sunergy, Hanwha SolarOne, Hareon, Jinko Solar and Renesola.4 The 
1. http://www.actupv.info/2011/10/saint_charles_solaire_ou_l_exemplarite_d_un_chantier_sans_lendemain-251878.
htm#.UmZOmfncCzl
2.  See: http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/163186/#sthash.sqLTo0u8.dpuf
3. ‘Punitive tariffs - no matter at what level - could cause irreversible damage to the entire European Photovoltaic (PV) 
value chain,’ AFASE said in a statement. ‘Those levels now reported would cost the EU PV industry and the whole of the 
EU economy dearly.’ (http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/163186/#sthash.sqLTo0u8.dpuf).
4. http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/china-eu-solar-imports--to-cap-or-not-to-cap_ 100012250/ 
#axzz2fngAxOAZ
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manufacturers included in the agreement would avoid paying anti-dumping duties 
on all their exports to Europe that fell under the volume cap. At the time of writing 
(September 2013), the EC was continuing the parallel anti-dumping and subsidy 
investigations, with a deadline for imposing definitive duties of 5 December 2013.5 
Such investigations are superimposed onto a long series of disputes over renew-
able energy goods and equipment between the EC and US on one side and China 
on the other. 
What is wrong with PV module imports from China? 
THE EU ARGUMENT AGAINST DUMPING
On 6 September 2009, the EC launched an investigation to determine whether 
crystalline silicon PV modules and equipment imported from China were being 
dumped and whether the dumped imports had caused injury to EU industry. The 
Notice of Initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding issued by the EC stipulated 
that the allegation of dumping was based on a comparison of the normal value 
thus established with the export price (at ex-works level) of the product under 
5. See http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/ec-forgoes-punitive-duties-but-continues-anti-subsidy-in-
vestigation-against-chinese-importers--_100012312/#ixzz2foeJVjIe
FIGURE 2.  A decade of disputes between the EU, the US and China on renewable energy
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investigation when sold for export to the Union (EC, 2012). Since the EU considers 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to be a non-market economy, the normal value 
for imports from the PRC were established on the basis of a constructed normal 
value (manufacturing costs; selling, general and administrative costs; and profit) 
in a market economy third country, namely India. 
After the issuance of its Notice of Initiation, the EC sent questionnaires to a sample 
of Chinese exporting producers (representing 80% of the total Chinese export value); 
as well as to a sample of EU producers (accounting for, as a percentage of the total 
EU production, between 18% and 21% for modules, between 17% and 24% for cells 
and between 28% and 35% for wafers); a sample of three unrelated importers for 
modules and one for cells; and upstream and downstream operators and their associ-
ations. The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary 
for the purpose of a provisional determination of i) dumping, ii) resulting injury 
and iii) EU interest. The results are shown below (EC, 2013):
For the sampled companies, the weighted average normal value of each type of the 
like product established for the analogue country was compared with the weighted 
average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned. On this 
basis the provisional weighted average dumping margins6 expressed as a percentage 
of the Cost Insurance and Freight (CIF) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, ranged 
between 48.1% and 112.6%. 
Against a generally increasing consumption, overall EU production increased for 
modules and cells in the period considered for investigation (1 July 2011 to 30 June 
2012 – hereafter referred to as the ‘investigation’ or ‘IP’). But the market share of 
the European Union industry shrank due to the greater increase of consumption. 
The EC concluded that the presence of Chinese imports and the increase of the 
market share of dumped imports from the PRC at prices that consistently undercut 
those of the European Union industry had a determining role in the material injury 
suffered by the European Union industry, ‘reflected in its poor financial situation 
and in the deterioration of most of the injury indicators such as profitability, cash 
flow, return on investments and ability to raise capital’ (EC, 2013). The investiga-
tion confirmed the existence of overcapacity in the global market and attributed 
it mainly to China. 
Assessing the interests of the Union industry, the Commission provisionally 
concluded that there were no compelling reasons against the imposition of provi-
sional measures on imports of the product concerned originating in China. The EC 
started by explicating the positive impacts of anti-dumping measures, emphasizing 
that the profitability of the Union industry would increase, and consequently that 
‘not only the existing 25,000 jobs of the Union industry would be secured but there 
would also be a reasonable prospect for further production expansion and increase in 
employment’ (EC, 2013). Regarding upstream operators such as silicon and manufac-
turing equipment producers and exporters, the Commission acknowledged that they 
6. The dumping margin is the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price.
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could face decreasing export prospects to China but that these could be compensated 
by the exports to growing third markets. 
Independently of the imposition of duties, the EC also indicated that the publicly 
available forecasts on the demand for PV installations available during the IP 
indicated a likely contraction in demand in 2013, ‘which would likely have in any 
event a negative impact on the number of jobs in the downstream market’ (EC, 2013). 
It was therefore concluded by the Commission that the impact of the anti-dumping 
duties on the downstream operators would be to a limited extent negative in the 
short term, in view of the higher contraction in installations than in a counterfactual 
scenario without duties, and to the extent that the duty could not be fully absorbed 
by the downstream operators.
WEAKNESSES IN EU ARGUMENTS AGAINST DUMPING
In its Regulation of 4 June 2013, the EC stated that during the IP the sale prices of 
crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. cells and wafers) 
originating in or consigned from the PRC were below the production costs, thus 
having a negative effect on the Union industry’s profitability (EC, 2013). However, 
the Commission did not fully elucidate why, out of all of the trade defence policy 
measures available in its portfolio, anti-dumping, instead of special safeguards, was 
deemed appropriate. 
The choice of one defence instrument over another is not politically neutral. In 
the case of safeguard measures, a country acknowledges that it cannot cope with 
market price swings, whatever the underlying reasons of market imbalances. In the 
case of anti-dumping7, a culprit is singled out. In both situations, domestic industry 
is temporarily protected. Additionally in the case of anti-dumping, anti-competitive 
practices are corrected for. As mentioned above, Chinese practices – e.g. policies - 
were almost absent from the investigation. And the amicable solution found on 27 
July 2013, according to De Gucht, which consisted in a price undertaking and annual 
import limits, did not make explicit the exact level of these two. One month after the 
amicable solution had been reached, no official price undertaking or annual import 
limits had been released. Pending the official release, the expected levels circulating in 
the media did not convince the complaining parties.8 As reported by PV Magazine, EU 
ProSun, the SolarWorld-backed lobby group that had worked hard to persuade the EC 
to take action against Chinese companies, remained dissatisfied with the end result.9 
A related weakness in the EU’s position lies in the choice of the reference market 
price – or ‘normal value’ of PV modules. Approaching the real cost of production 
7. Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement, dumping is condemned but is not prohibited.
8. Once month after De Gucht’s statement, the EU continued to decline to release specific details on prices and quantity 
limits. According to information found in the media, the minimum net import price for modules was €0.56 per watt, with 
an annual import limit of 7 GW; the net import price for cells was €0.29 per watt, with an import limit of 2.3 GW; and 
the net import price for wafers was €0.66 a piece, with an import limit of 1 GW (http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/
details/beitrag/eu-china-deal-continues-to-irk-industry_100012444/#ixzz2gNOhfvqw)
9. http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/eu-china-deal-continues-to-irk-industry_100012444/#ixzz2g
NJZxzMY
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of any product in a non-market economy remains fraught with difficulty; this said, 
the outcome of the EU’s investigation makes it hard to claim that the normal value 
estimated by the Commission is the best estimate of the production cost in China. A 
careful reading of the Regulation document released by the EC reveals that the choice 
of the US as an analogue country was firstly made by the Commission – as in about 
half of the anti-dumping cases with non-market economies (Eggert, 2006).10 The 
choice of the US PV price as a reference cost is debatable, as the EC itself admitted, 
‘mainly due to the fact that the US market was protected from Chinese imports 
during part of the IP by anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures’ (EC, 2013). India 
was eventually chosen. But the same criticism should have prevailed, in addition to 
a few others that we summarize below. 
When the investigation was launched by the EU, the media reported that India 
was expected to set in motion an anti-dumping investigation into imports of PV 
modules into the country. According to the Indian Ministry of Commerce, India’s 
solar manufactures had called for anti-dumping duties as high as 200%.11 Domestic 
manufacturers ‘were struggling to survive under conditions of oversupply. They 
ha(d) not been able to compete with their global competitors on prices’12 in spite of 
trade protection. For the product code CN 8541 40 (solar cells whether or not assem-
bled in modules), the basic duty rate is nil in India, but add to this an additional 
countervailing duty (CVD) of 12%, a central excise education ‘cess’ rate of 3%, a 
custom education cess rate of 3% and a CVD special duty of 4%, which altogether 
amount to a duty rate equivalent of 17.24%. These duties complete domestic content 
measures (DCM) imposed on crystalline silicon (c-Si) solar cells and modules for 
projects under the National Solar Mission which aims to add 20 GW of solar power 
capacity to the country by 2022.
On 29 April 2013, based on an application from the Solar Manufacturers Associa-
tion, India’s Directorate General of Anti-dumping and Allied Duties (DGAD) initi-
ated an investigation on imports of solar cells whether or not assembled partially or 
fully in modules or panels or on glass or some other suitable substrates, originating in 
or exported from Malaysia, China PR, Chinese Taipei and United States of America. 
Following this proposal, the US filed a request with the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) to intervene and protect the interests of American manufacturers. The 
Indian government subsequently challenged the American request at the WTO but 
was unsuccessful. India’s PV manufacture sector, at the time when the EC chose 
it as a reference market, was hence both protected and – to put it bluntly – in bad 
economic shape. 
In addition, two severe weaknesses must be highlighted. In the sample of the compa-
nies surveyed in India, only one provided a complete reply to the EU questionnaire. 
10. For a Chinese perspective on EU ‘analogy methodology’, see Kong Qingjiang (2012).
11. http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/indian-solar-manufacturers-ask-for-anti-dumping-duties-of-up-
to-200_100008789/#ixzz2g6C6avi3
12. Id.
INNOVATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
A PLANET FOR L IFE288
Furthermore, contrary to the Chinese companies involved, the Indian company did 
not produce solar wafers, which further complicated the establishment of normal 
value. First, this possibly led to an overestimate of PV module costs on the grounds 
that this company was unable to make integration-related cost savings. Second, it 
was not possible to estimate the price of a PV cell using the same methodology as for 
a module, therefore the prices of South Korean wafers on the Indian market were 
used. The overall impact being to bias upward the Indian PV price and along with 
it the estimated dumping margin. 
Considering PV panel as a commodity 
ASSESSING THE LEARNING CURVE EFFECTS IN PV PRICE DECLINE
An alternative hypothesis to deliberate dumping can explain the long lasting fall 
in PV module prices. Economic theory indeed isolates several forces likely to drive 
prices downward. Such bearish forces can be broken down into the two following 
sets (Hayward and Graham, 2011):
 m Experience curves, also called learning curves, relate production costs to the 
accumulation of experience, often measured by cumulative production. Experi-
ence curves are based on the theory of learning-by-doing, which asserts that 
‘technical change in general can be ascribed to experience, that it is the very 
activity of production which gives rise to problems for which favourable responses 
are selected over time’ (Arrow, 1962). Due to learning and experience, encom-
passing factors such as technological change and economies of scale, the higher 
the amount of PV modules produced and installed, the lower their cost. 
 m Market forces come in two separate but related guises: the global market for the 
technologies themselves and the raw materials used in their production. Supply-
demand imbalances can manifest as a price bubble on the top of the ordinary cost 
curve and/or a price dip if circumstances contrive to create a depressed market 
for the technology and its raw materials. 
These two different forces presumably interacted in the case of PV, as upward and 
downward cycles along the learning curve tend to suggest. 
Econometric estimates of the factors influencing price reduction in photovoltaics 
qualify the exact contribution of the different drivers underlying the learning curve. 
Nemet (2005) showed that economies of scale (plant size), technological change 
(efficiency gains) and the declining price of silicon were the main factors driving 
down the price of PV during the pre-bubble period (1975-2001).13 However, their 
learning curve model explains less than 60% of the change in price over the period 
considered, which means that non-learning curve effects must be taken into account 
to explain PV module price motion. De La Tour, Glachant and Ménière (2013) identi-
fied an experience curve model which minimizes the difference between predicted 
and actual module prices over the period 1990 to 2011. Their model predicts a 67% 
13.  We deliberately use price and not cost when discussing learning curve effects, the latter being discussed further below.
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decrease of module price from 2011 to 2020. The authors derive from the learning 
curve’s forecast value that the price of solar electricity would reach that of conven-
tional electricity by 2020 in the sunniest countries or regions with annual solar 
irradiation of 2000 kWh/year or more, such as California, Italy and Spain. This 
learning curve effect on expected PV price does not, however, seem to properly 
account for the ongoing and rapid convergence of PV electricity price towards grid-
parity in more than ten major markets worldwide – i.e. well before the 2020 date 
indicated by the authors.14
THE COMMODITIZATION OF PV PANELS
If learning curves provide only incomplete explanations for downturns in PV module 
prices, a further examination of the second set of bearish forces, namely global 
market imbalances, reveals more satisfactory answers. Such imbalances, manifested 
in price hikes and dips and temporary disconnections between the market value of a 
product and its marginal cost, are common features of primary commodities markets. 
Interestingly, they are usually considered as a rarity in the manufacture sector 
where operators are assumed to adjust margins to meet downstream demand at a 
stable price (World Bank, 1994). This distinction between primary and manufac-
ture markets – the former being intrinsically instable, the latter the opposite - has 
prevailed throughout the 20th century. However, it does not account for the blurring 
of the frontiers of these two classes of goods and the transformation of one class 
of product into another – something that has been dubbed ‘commoditization’. A 
commodity (be it primary or manufactured) is a product that is completely undif-
ferentiated. Commoditization occurs when a product becomes less differentiated, 
so that buyers care less about from whom they buy. The key effect of commoditiza-
tion is that it reduces the pricing power of the producer: if products become more 
alike from a buyer’s point of view they tend to buy the cheapest. 
As pointed out by Graeme Pietersz (2013), commoditization is a key reason why 
many growth markets disappoint investors: sales volumes grow as expected but, as 
the market matures, prices come under pressure and margins shrink. The personal 
computer market and certain other types of computer hardware such as memory 
chips, which have oscillating prices around downward-sloped learning curves, 
provide a good example of this: ‘When this was a fast growing industry each computer 
manufacturer would sell a computer together with a built in operating system, both of 
which were unique. Different manufacturers’ products looked different, ran different 
14. An unpublished Deutsche Bank research note hence asserts that ‘The [PV] sector has passed the tipping point for grid 
parity in more than ten major markets worldwide and has the potential to achieve competitiveness in 10-20 additional 
markets over the next three years. As module prices stabilize around $0.60-$0.70/W, the levelized cost of solar electricity 
without subsidies is now 10-20c/kWh in several major regions of the world. Rising electricity prices, a need for competi-
tive generation sources and lowered balance of system costs will drive further improvement over the next several years.’ 
(quoted by James Montgomery, Associate Editor, RenewableEnergyWorld.com, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/
rea/news/article/2013/08/analyst-grid-parity-era-now-underway-for-global-solar-markets).  Estimates of grid parity value 
are however biased towards renewable sources in most analyses, the fixed cost of electricity supply to end users (grid 
investment, distribution, stability, etc.) being incurred by historical suppliers of electricity (coal, gas, nuclear) and not to 
the most recent and complementary ones (e.g. renewables) for which only variable costs are inferred.  
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software and had very different capabilities. At this point the market attracted 
many growth investors as it was obvious that demand for the new technology was 
exploding. As the market matured two vital changes happened. The product became 
standardized, and therefore largely commoditized. In addition personal computer 
manufacturers largely ceased being significant producers of software — which is 
highly differentiated and commands huge margins’.15 This is very likely to have 
been the case in the PV module sector, where a 30-year-old technology (crystalline 
silicon) eventually commoditized the downstream manufactured good (the module 
and cells) (Chase, 2013). 
A temporary excess supply leading to plummeting prices is hence conceivable in the 
PV market, as it is in many commodity markets, such as computers, memory chips, 
cocoa beans, hogs and financial assets, without the involvement of dumping or subsi-
dies. Commodity prices fluctuate randomly, to paraphrase Paul Samuelson (1963), 
and this randomness can generate unexpected downturns below the marginal cost. 
Interestingly, some interested parties consulted by the EC during the investigation 
argued that PV modules and equipment had become ‘a commodity where individual 
producers are not able anymore to set prices but where prices are subject to world-
wide demand and supply’. These interested parties alleged that it was this situation 
that had caused the material injury of the European Union industry rather than the 
dumped imports (EC, 2013). The investigation did not refute the fact – or assumption 
– that PV modules and equipment had become a commodity, simply emphasizing 
that this does not account for unfair price behaviour and trade practices.  
Of course, should a large trading country set export subsidies or taxes, these could 
magnify the temporary disconnection between world prices and their competitive 
market equilibrium value. What remains obscure is the reasons why the EC chose 
a commodity with limited added value prospects – as commoditization implies – to 
flex its muscles against China. This is where political factors come in.
What is at stake in the solar war?
BALANCED TRADE AND MANUFACTURE JOBS
In 2012, the European Parliament issued a report, Unbalanced trade?, on EU and 
China trade, where it emphasized that ‘trade between EU and China has been growing 
rapidly and continuously in the last three decades, reaching a peak amount of total 
trade of €395 billion in 2010, […] the imbalance in bilateral trade has been in China’s 
favour since 1997, this trade deficit amounted to €168.8 billion in 2010 compared to 
€49 billion in 2000.’ The report further elucidates that: ‘the value added to Chinese 
exports is very limited once the value of components imported from the EU and 
elsewhere is discounted; […] foreign companies established in China account for 
nearly 85% of all export trade deriving from assembly operations’ (European Parlia-
ment, 2012). The two parts of this quotation provide us with the possible primary 
15. Graeme Pietersz (2013) Commoditisation, http://moneyterms.co.uk/commoditisation/
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reasons for the EC’s decision to stand against China on the grounds of anti-dumping, 
rather than to explore safeguards. To further explore this line of reasoning, we start 
by analysing the unbalanced trade aspect of the above quotation, before moving on 
to the part about the limitations to the value added to Chinese exports. 
The fast increasing trade deficit of the EU vis-à-vis China on PV panels and cells 
has undoubtedly played a major role in the anti-dumping initiative from the EC’s 
Directorate-General for Trade (DG Trade). The addition of the trade balances on 
silicon, wafers, PV panels, cells and inverters, reveals that EU trade averaged a yearly 
deficit with China of €10 billion between 2008 and 2011, to be compared with a trade 
surplus five years previously (Table 1). The magnitude and speed of this deteriora-
tion are reminiscent of the events that took place in the textiles and clothing trade 
following the expiration of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement in January 2005: there 
was a sudden and sharp degradation of the EU’s trade position in relation to China. 
Yet two salient differences remain: in the case of PV, there is no tariff cut or quota 
removal to explain the sudden upsurge of EU imports from China; while the symbolic 
value of PV modules and components - high-tech products of the ‘third industrial 
revolution’, the importance of which have been underlined by EC President José 
Manuel Durão Barroso16 - is definitely much higher for the EU than that of timeless 
knickers and bras. The emblematic nature of PV also crystallizes expectations of 
‘green job’ creation in the EU, and hence of reversing the declining proportion of 
employment in EU manufacturing, which is a particular trauma in France regard-
less of the very limited support the PV industry has received from France so far. 
The consequences of a higher (than dumped) PV price in Europe are not straight-
forward. One would expect some jobs to be saved in EU PV manufacturing as a 
result of EU anti-dumping measures, however, some could be lost among upstream 
operators facing decreasing export prospects to China, and also downstream among 
installers. Addressing this empirical issue, the EC (2013) cites a study by Prognos 
which predicts that out of the 265,000 estimated jobs that existed in 2011 at all 
16.  ‘Europe’s energy policy and the third industrial revolution’, Loyola de Palacio energy conference, Madrid, 1 October 
2007. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-07-580_en.htm.
TABLE 1 EU-CHINA TRADE, CUMULATIVE VALUE (IN EUROS MILLIONS)
EU Imports from China EU Exports to China Balance Yearly Average
C-Si (SH280461) 62.29939 1701.72 1639.42061 409.8551525
Wafers ( SH381800) 1134.348 420.4735 – 713.8745 – 178.468625
PV Panels and Cells (SH 854140) 40812.062 793.6694 – 40018.3926 – 10004.59815
Invertors (SH850440) 787.5527 163.041 – 624.5117 – 156.127925
Total 11-14 42796.262 3078.904 -39717.358 – 9 929.340
 Source of data : EUROSTAT
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stages of the Union PV market including Union producers, importers, the upstream 
and downstream operators according to European Photovoltaic Industry Associa-
tion (EPIA) (2011), up to 242,000 jobs would be lost in three years, depending 
on the level of duties. It is thought that most of the job losses would occur in the 
downstream market, which Prognos said employed about 220,000 people in 2011.
The information obtained by the EC during a verification visit to the EPIA indicates 
that the number of direct PV jobs calculated for 2011 would have a margin of error 
of up to 20%. In addition, the estimation includes employment in other European 
countries outside the Union as well as employment related to thin film products, 
which falls outside the scope of the investigation. The investigation did not confirm 
the above scenario and pointed to a much lower number of direct jobs existing in 
the Union PV market in 2011, during the IP and in 2012.
IS CHINA CATCHING UP ON THE UPSTREAM EDGE OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN?
Here we move to the second part of the aforementioned quotation – the notion 
that overall ‘the value added to Chinese exports is very limited once the value of 
components imported from the EU and elsewhere is discounted; […] foreign compa-
nies established in China account for nearly 85% of all export trade deriving from 
assembly operations’ (European Parliament, 2012). This rosy vision no longer holds, 
fuelling fears that China is catching up on the upstream edge of the supply chain.  
The issue at stake can be looked at in the following way: do global market forces 
trigger and spread innovation today according to the way described in economics 
textbooks? Or is the Samuelson syndrome at work, whereby massive technology 
transfers/imitation to/in green technology-late-mover China leads to a real income 
BOX 1.THE DIMINISHING RETURNS OF GLOBALIZATION
In a 2004 controversial paper1, 
Nobel Prize winner Paul Samu-
elson sketched out the possible 
consequences of China catching 
up with the US in the very sector 
where the US enjoyed a compar-
ative advantage – in other words, 
where it was leading the so-called 
green race. In his paper, this was 
supposed to happen as a result of 
technical innovation (‘imitation or 
home ingenuity’) and outsourcing. 
‘What does [the] arithmetic tell us 
about realistic US long-run effects 
from such outsourcings? The new 
[…] productivities [levels] imply 
that, this invention abroad that 
gives to China some of the compar-
ative advantage that had belonged 
to the United States can induce for 
the United States permanent lost 
per capita real income’ (id.).
Forecasts on future investments in 
clean energy technology and antici-
pated trends in installed renewable 
energy capacity between the EU27, 
China and the US provide possible 
illustrations of the Samuelson 
syndrome: real wages in the sector 
concerned and potential overall real 
GDP could decline should China 
continue to catch up in green tech-
nologies and grasp an ever wider 
share of the value added in the 
supply chain. The problem here is 
not that renewable technologies 
present salient features that compa-
nies and countries must consider 
while taking part in the green race, 
but that China and India tend to 
specialize in the very sectors or tasks 
where, historically, ‘Quad countries’ 
enjoyed undisputed comparative 
advantages when trading with one 
another.
Source: Voituriez and Balmer 
(2012)
1. Samuelson, P. (2004) ‘Where Ricardo 
and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of 
Mainstream Economists Supporting Globali-
zation’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
vol. 18, n° 3 (Summer, 2004): 135-146.
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decline in green-technology first-mover countries, such as the US or EU (Samuelson, 
2004; see also Box 1) and in turn, to dwindling innovation in the latter? If this was 
the case, then the division of labour advocated by China’s Premier ‘(where) “designed 
in Europe” is combined with “made in China” and (where) European technologies 
are applied to the Chinese market’ would no longer produce ‘amazing results’17 due 
to a lack of activity in terms of ‘designed in Europe’. 
Without being explicitly mentioned in the EU’s 2013 Commission Regulation or 
in the various statements of EU leaders, the Samuelson syndrome and its long-term 
devastating effect on EU productivity and growth may well have been in the minds 
of European leaders when they asked for punitive anti-dumping duties. Buthow 
close are we exactly to the world envisioned by Samuelson (2004)? Technology 
transfers have occurred on a massive scale between OECD countries and China, 
mainly through trade in intermediate goods. Over the last seven years, China has 
acquired production technologies to develop a high performing solar PV industry 
by purchasing turnkey production lines from German, US and Japanese suppliers 
and by recruiting skilled executives from the Chinese diaspora who built pioneer 
PV firms, according to De la Tour, Glachant and Ménière (2010). They are now able 
to manufacture their own production equipment (Glachant, Dussaux, Ménière, 
Dechezleprêtre, 2013), an area where US and German firms once enjoyed undis-
puted comparative advantage. 
Moreover, the idea of a manufacturing China is not confirmed by the most 
recent patent data. Drawing on figures from the World Patent Statistical Database 
(PATSTAT), Glachant et al., (2013) provide us with a breakdown of climate-related 
patents by country. What becomes evident is that China is the only emerging economy 
in the Top 10, according to PATSTAT. Other major emerging economies or transition 
countries such as India, Russia or Brazil account for less than 1% of world innova-
tion. The authors emphasize that other studies dealing with waste or green chemistry 
confirm the stylized facts. Figure 4 shows the shares of major countries in innovation 
patented worldwide, for each segment of the PV industry in the two years 2006 and 
2007 prior to the crisis. China’s performance is impressive: it indeed ranks third in 
all segments. Surprisingly, it leads with 37% of world patents in the silicon produc-
tion segment for which its market shares are the tiniest. China’s patenting activity 
is significantly higher in silicon production, ingot and wafer manufacturing than its 
contribution to world production (2.5% and 5%, respectively). The reverse is true 
in downstream segments. China is the second largest producer with a 27% market 
share (leader since 2008 with more than 35%) whereas it generates only around 
15% of worldwide inventions. 
What is the underlying strategy of Chinese companies? Do they intend to specialize 
further in upstream segments where the profits are the highest (Figure 3)? 
Part of the answer lies in the genuine innovative content of patents and also in 
what’s going on outside the patenting process. An often-used indicator to gauge 
17. See footnote 2.
BOX 1.THE DIMINISHING RETURNS OF GLOBALIZATION
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the genuine innovative value of patents is the share of patents that are also filed 
abroad. Only valuable inventions are patented abroad – for obvious cost reasons 
– while minor ones are patented on the domestic market only. Of course this way 
of gauging the value of a patent is far from perfect and open to debate, but it can 
be used as a rough guide. According to the screening of the PATSTAT database 
by De la Tour et al., (2010), only 1% of Chinese patents are also filed abroad, as 
compared to 15% for Germany, 26% for Japan and 7% for the US. This figure, the 
authors claimed, ‘reinforces the hypothesis that the value of the average Chinese 
patented invention is quite low’. They considered that this hypothesis is supported 
by the fact that Chinese firms devoted a low percentage of revenue to R&D (0.4% 
to 0.8%, while these figures are between 1.4% and 5% in western companies) (id.). 
Chinese companies, they concluded, ‘have a higher propensity to patent than their 
foreign competitors – they file more patent applications for an equivalent innovation 
FIGURE 3 The manufacturing of value by the photovoltaic industry
The photovoltaic industry includes various products, the control and production of which do not generate the same added value. Today 
we are witnessing a repositioning of Chinese manufacturers in those sectors with high added value.
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output.’18 Going from this low patent value to the conclusion that Chinese firms do 
not innovate could be misleading, as the authors acknowledged. Their field work and 
interviews in China suggest that Chinese innovation focuses more on process, which 
is often not carried out in specific R&D departments but directly on the production 
lines, and protected by secrecy rather than patenting (id.). Even unconfirmed by 
comprehensive data covering patented and non-patented innovation in China, the 
Samuelson syndrome hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Conclusion
What lessons can be drawn from the ongoing solar trade war between the EU and 
China? Our basic argument is threefold. Firstly, the case of dumping put forward 
by the Commission and endorsed by a few ministers from EU countries is not fully 
convincing. Long-lasting downturns in prices that occasionally fall below the cost of 
18. De la Tour, Glachant and Ménière (2010) carried out investigations in China which indeed confirmed that local 
companies were involved in the intensive patenting of minor inventions. Interestingly, they noticed that ‘the reason is 
not to protect the inventions – critical inventions are usually kept secret – but to send a signal to public authorities. In 
particular, the allocation of public subsidies by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is significantly 
influenced by the quantity of patents.’ 
FIGURE 4  Actors of solar innovation
China has become a major player in solar innovation, ranking third in three of the four areas of innovation.
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production due to market imbalances is typical of commodity markets. The EC in its 
investigation was not able to reject the hypothesis that there has been a commod-
itization of PV panels, and neither can the authors of this chapter. This hypothesis 
was implicitly confirmed by the content of the temporary deal struck by the EU and 
China, which consisted of price floors and import quotas, which are historically 
genuine commodity market management devices. The acknowledgement that PV 
panels could be classified as commodities weakens the dumping probe and provides 
little support for the EU’s decision to adopt anti-dumping measures for an undif-
ferentiated commodity that, as commoditization implies, offers declining margin 
prospects. 
Our second argument contradicts the reconciliatory view of China’s Premier, 
according to whom, ‘When “designed in Europe” is combined with “made in China” 
and when European technologies are applied to the Chinese market, there will be 
amazing results’.19 We contend that the division of labour in the PV supply chain is 
experiencing a profound reshuffling, whereby vertically integrated Chinese compa-
nies are gaining ground in the upstream value chain and there is a sharp increase in 
R&D expenses and patenting activities. Even though marginal in comparison with 
figures from the US, EU and Japan, innovation in China, be it genuine or not, could 
have the paradoxical effect of cooling innovation in Europe, rather than spurring 
it on, so long as the EU does not clarify the industrial objectives associated with its 
climate and energy targets. 
Finally, we argue that the EU’s objective to bring back Europe’s manufacturing of 
crystalline PV modules could result in possible benefits in terms of upstream and 
downstream spillover effects, although we were unable to gather empirical evidence 
in support of this statement. In a similar fashion, bringing back PV manufacturing to 
Europe could be deemed as a necessary condition for sustaining PV innovation. Yet 
innovation spillovers remain elusive between current crystalline PV panel manufac-
turing and the development of the next PV generation. The solar war crystallizes 
technological catch-up by China on decades-old technology. What is at stake for 
the leaders of the green race, such as the EU, and for the mitigation of greenhouse 
gases, is not so much whether China is involved in dumping and the effect that this 
might have on commodity export prices, but how far the technology frontier can be 
expanded, and to what extent the manufacture of silicon PV modules can benefit 
this process. ❚
19.  Li Keqiang ‘China has high hopes for European ties’ Financial Times, 1 May 2012. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
f6911db2-92aa-11e1-b6e2-00144feab49a.html#axzz2fLPcVcj5
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